Many firms that employ low-wage workers cannot afford to offer an employee health plan, and many of the uninsured work for such firms. This article makes the case for an employer tax credit, administered by the Internal Revenue Service, as a way to extend health coverage to uninsured workers and their families. The permanent, fixeddollar, refundable credit would be available to all low-wage employers (those with average wages of $10 per hour and less), including those already offering coverage. The credit would be graduated depending on average wage: the maximum credit would equal 50% of the cost of a standard benefit package; the minimum would equal 30% of the package. It also would vary by family size and could be used to cover part-time and temporary workers. Participating employers would be required to pay at least 50% of the health insurance premium, proof of which would be shown on firms' tax returns. The paper provides justification for this approach. It closes with a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of this approach and alternative design features.
The problem of the uninsured is largely a problem of working people. More than 80% of people who lack health insurance live in households with at least one worker. Most work for employers who do not provide health coverage, yet they and their families are not eligible for public programs. One way to extend health coverage to such people is to have the federal government offer tax credits to employers that contribute to the cost of their employees' health insurance.
Many employers do not provide health coverage because they believe it is too expensive. This is particularly true of small firms. In 1999, only 55% of firms with three to 10 workers offered health coverage, whereas among firms with 50 or more workers, more than 90% did so. Among small firms that do not offer coverage, 68% cite the high cost of premiums as a major reason (Gabel et al. 1999) .
Although small firms are particularly likely not to offer coverage, not all of the uninsured work for small firms. A distinctive feature of the strategy presented in this paper is that the tax credits for employers would assist all firms that employ primarily lower-wage workers, not just small firms. Thus, assistance would be targeted (indirectly) to workers who would have difficulty affording health insurance on their own, regardless of the source of their employment. A cap on the tax credit (premium subsidy) for employers with average wages above a specified level also would screen out smaller firms comprised primarily of high-earning professionals (for example, law firms).
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Another advantage of the tax credit approach is that it would work through the existing federal tax system; no new programs or bureaucracies would have to be established. Furthermore, if the program were properly designed, the cost of the subsidy could be controlled.
The principal disadvantage of this approach, which it shares with other approaches involving tax credits as incentives to offer health insurance, is cost. To be effective, a credit (and premium subsidy) has to be substantial. Unless employer tax credits are set at rather high levels and thus cover a large portion of the cost of health coverage, the ''take-up rate'' among employers will be quite low. Even when employers do decide to offer coverage, unless a tax credit is sufficient to induce employers to contribute a substantial amount toward the premium, employees may not take up the employer's offer of coverage. However, a credit set high enough to overcome this problem can be expensive, and the cost will be higher if all employers meeting the wage-level criterion are eligible, including those already offering and funding coverage.
This paper describes how an employer tax credit could be designed to encourage more employers to offer coverage without its being so costly as to make the idea politically infeasible. Although we confine our discussion to employer tax credits, it is worth noting that the approach is compatible with extending tax credits to low-wage employees as well. Since employer-sponsored coverage has significant advantages over individually purchased coverage, it is important to give employers inducements to offer coverage to their employees rather than simply to extend subsidies to employees so they can buy coverage in the individual market. Offering subsidies to both lowwage employers and their employees likely would increase the take-up rate substantially.
Background
The effectiveness of a health insurance tax credit depends in part on the willingness of employers to offer coverage when they previously did not do so. That will depend, in turn, on how responsive employers are to a reduction in the price of coverage, which is the effect of the tax credit. Several studies have examined this question, using a variety of research methods. One group of studies used variations in tax rates across states to determine the impact of aftertax prices on small firms' willingness to offer health coverage. Estimates of the price elasticity in this group of studies ranged from Ϫ.63 to Ϫ2.9, indicat-ing a strong response by employers to price changes (in other words, price declines of 1% should increase the quantity of health insurance purchased by slightly less than 1% to nearly 3%) (Gruber 1999) .
Actual experience yields a less optimistic view of the likely success of using tax credits as subsidies to induce employers to offer coverage. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several states began to experiment with both tax credits and direct premium payments for employers who newly offered health coverage. 1 The tax credits were generally quite small (for example, $25 to $35 per employee per month) and were not well publicized. The take-up rate by employers was very low, with most sites achieving less than 10% participation rates after more than a year in operation. Kansas, Kentucky, and Oregon used tax credits to try to induce companies to offer health coverage, generally with very limited success. But Oregon's program did manage to sign up more than 13,000 employers, affecting about 43,000 people.
Over this same period, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation ran a $6 million demonstration project enabling states to design and offer direct premium subsidies for employers offering health insurance. While the experience varied considerably over 10 sites, in general there was only a tepid response from the business community to the new subsidies, even though the projects effectively lowered premiums for employers by 25% to 40%. In Florida, for example, a demonstration project that used a state purchasing cooperative to lower premiums for firms with fewer than 20 workers offering coverage for the first time enrolled only 1.7% to 5% of the target group of firms in five participating cities.
More recently, in 1997, New York initiated a direct premium assistance program that sparked considerable interest. In a little over a year, some 1,100 firms signed up, and a waiting list developed because only $6 million had been appropriated for the program. The program is being phased out, however. It will be replaced by a larger program that will provide statesponsored stop-loss coverage to health plans to reduce premiums-rather than provide direct premium assistance to small employers.
A review of these initiatives leads to the conclusion that if tax subsidies for employers are to have a noticeable impact on health coverage, they will need to include features that make them more costly than the pilot projects tried to date. For example, the value of the credit must be substantial. In pilot projects, to hold down costs and limit the inequities for firms that already were offering coverage, many states offered 204 the subsidy for only a limited number of years. Employers also reacted negatively to the ''pilot'' nature of the projects, fearing that they would start offering coverage with the help of the subsidy but then quickly be left to finance the full cost. The experience to date suggests that a major effort would have to be made to publicize the subsidies: employers often were simply unaware of the subsidies.
The Target Population
The target population for the tax subsidy is firms with wages below a defined level. For the purpose of this analysis, we set the average wage rate cutoff at $10 an hour. For a full-time worker, this translates into an annual salary of about $20,000 a year. Since the average family has 1.6 workers, some families with incomes exceeding $20,000 per year would benefit from the subsidy. We propose to extend eligibility to all low-wage employers, regardless of whether they currently offer coverage.
Key Design Features
Several important design features increase the likelihood that this employer tax-credit strategy would succeed in reducing substantially the number of working uninsured while containing program costs:
Ⅺ The credit would be available only to low-wage firms-those with average wage levels at or below $10 per hour-and would be graduated so that the amount of the credit was largest for firms with the lowest average wage. Ⅺ The credit would be permanent, available as long as the firm met the low-wage test of eligibility. Ⅺ The tax credit would be available to all low-wage firms, not just to those that did not offer coverage. Ⅺ The credit would comprise a large enough proportion of the cost of health coverage to induce a meaningful take-up rate among employers and their employees. Ⅺ The tax credit would be set at a fixed-dollar amount. Ⅺ The credit would be tied to the price of a ''standard'' cost-effective benefit package. Ⅺ The credit would be uniform across the nation. Ⅺ The credit would be updated annually by repricing the standard benefit package. Ⅺ Firms would have to contribute toward the premium an amount equal to at least 50% of the cost of the standard benefit package. Ⅺ Employers taking the credit would have to offer coverage on the same basis to all full-time work-ers; coverage offered to part-time and temporary workers, though not mandatory, also would qualify for the credit. Ⅺ The credit amount would be different for single and family coverage. Ⅺ Firms would be required to show proof of the amount they contribute to coverage when they filed their income taxes and claim the credit. Ⅺ Firms would be able to claim the credit in installments rather than wait until they filed their annual income taxes, and the credit would be refundable if it exceeded the firm's tax liability.
Targeting the Credit to Lower-Wage Firms
A unique feature of the proposed tax credit is that it would be targeted to lower-wage firms. The credits would apply only to firms with average wage levels at or below $10 per hour, and the amount of the subsidy would increase as average wages fell below that level. The maximum credit-equal to 50% of the cost of a standard benefit package-would apply to firms with average wages below $7 per hour. Firms with average wages between $7 and $8.50 would get 40% of the cost of the standard benefit package, and firms with average wages between $8.50 and $10 would get 30% of this amount. The hourly wage rates used to determine eligibility would be updated periodically, using the Consumer Price Index, to ensure that the wage-level cutoffs represent constant purchasing power and are not eroded by inflation. There are compelling reasons to target the subsidies to low-wage firms. First, low-wage firms are much more likely to be non-offerers of health coverage. For example, a recent study by the RAND Corporation found that for low-wage firms with fewer than 50 workers, only 17% offered health coverage compared with 47% of higher-wage firms of the same size (Long and Marquis 1999) . When group coverage is not available, these workers are also less likely to be able to do the ''next best thing''-that is, purchase coverage in the individual market. Such coverage is estimated to cost about 25% to 40% more than group coverage (Pauly and Herring 1999) . 2 Second, targeting low-wage firms ensures that subsidies are not given to groups of high-earning professionals who can afford unsubsidized coverage. Besides conforming to widely accepted standards of fairness, implementation of this provision would reduce the cost of the program to the federal government.
One drawback of this feature is that it adds a layer of administrative complexity to the system because firms would have to collect and report average wage levels. Most companies, however, should have such information readily available.
Another concern that arises when subsidies are available only to low-wage firms is the ''notch'' problem: if there is a single cutoff point for eligibility, firms with wage levels just above the cutoff point receive no assistance even though their circumstances are essentially the same as firms just below the cutoff point. A gradual phasing out of the subsidy for firms with wage levels above the initial cutoff point, as we propose, can reduce such inequities. Not only is the approach more equitable, but it also gives employers less reason to worry that granting a wage increase would produce a large reduction in the firm's health insurance subsidy. However, making the subsidy graduated adds to administrative complexity.
An alternative to using firms' average wage levels to target the subsidy is using the proportion of workers with wages below a threshold level. For example, a firm's eligibility for the tax credit could be contingent upon 60% of the employees earning less than $10 per hour. This alternative might improve the target efficiency of the employer tax credits, because it would screen in some companies in which most of the workers receive low wages but the average wage is above the threshold. An example would be a small company in which the president, and perhaps one or two senior managers, earned high salaries that push the average wage above $10 per hour. However, this alternative also would exclude some firms that appropriately could be subsidized, such as companies whose average wage was below $10 per hour but whose percentage of employees earning $10 per hour was just below the cutoff level (for instance, 59% in our previous illustration). Either approach likely would exclude some firms that should be eligible. A third alternative would be to combine the two approaches, allowing firms to qualify either if the average wage was below a specified level or if the proportion of low-wage workers in the employer's workforce fell below a specified proportion.
An Ongoing Credit
The tax credit described here would be permanent, not temporary. An employer would qualify for the credit as long as the average wage paid to employees fell below the cutoff point. The most important reason for making the premium assistance permanent is to increase the ''take-up'' and the ''stay-put'' rates. The evidence cited earlier makes it clear that many employers are reluctant to take advantage of subsi-dies if they know they are temporary. Apparently, employers do not want, or believe that they would not be able, to bear the full cost when the subsidy is reduced or eliminated, and they would rather not provide coverage at all than provide it for a while and then drop it. Furthermore, if the subsidy were temporary, some employers who would take up coverage later would drop it when the subsidy expired. If the subsidy were permanent, however, most of these employers would continue to offer coverage.
The disadvantage of this approach compared to a temporary subsidy is the budgetary cost. When subsidies are temporary, the cost is obviously lowerthough it is important to recall that for firms with rising real wage levels, the amount of the subsidy would decrease over time and might disappear.
All Low-Wage Firms Eligible
Another feature distinguishes this proposal from many other incremental approaches for extending coverage to the uninsured: the subsidy would be available to firms that already offer coverage, as well as to those that do not. Making all low-wage firms eligible is a corollary of the decision to make subsidies permanent. Unless subsidies were available to firms already offering health coverage, these firms would be treated inequitably.
Approaches that restrict eligibility to firms not offering coverage treats firms differentially that are in all relevant respects essentially the same, giving subsidies to some but not to others. In other words, firms already offering coverage would be penalized. According to economic theory, to attract an adequate supply of labor, firms in a labor market must pay comparable workers essentially the same total compensation (defined as cash wages plus benefits). Thus, if one firm in an industry pays for health coverage and another does not, then the non-offering firm must pay higher cash wages or increase the generosity of other employee benefits to offset the absence of health benefits. If the firm not offering health coverage becomes eligible for the tax credit and decides to offer coverage, this firm will have a competitive advantage over firms already offering coverage, and thus not eligible for the subsidy. So the firm newly offering coverage now is being subsidized by the federal government in the amount of the tax credit. This firm thus will be able to pay its workers higher cash wages and thereby attract more productive workers; or, alternatively, it will be able to pay the same total compensation but use the savings to invest in some other part of the business or to increase profits.
Subsidized firms (that is, those receiving the tax credit) would gain relative to competing firms that are ineligible for the tax credit. Firms that began contributing to health insurance before a tax credit was available could complain legitimately that they were being penalized for having made the decision to provide coverage. Many low-wage firms are marginally profitable, so that giving an advantage to newly insuring firms relative to those already providing coverage might cause some of the latter to go under. Such inequities might be tolerable if the subsidies were phased out after five years or so, but they are not justifiable if the subsidy is permanent.
The obvious disadvantage of this all-inclusive approach is the higher budgetary cost: some firms that did not need the inducement of a tax credit to offer coverage now would receive subsidies. It could be argued that the money that goes to these firms is ''wasted,'' in the sense that it does not buy any reduction in the number of uninsured. We acknowledge the criticism, but we think the argument is not compelling, not only because of the inequities just examined, but for other reasons as well.
First, when subsidies are confined to employers not offering coverage, considerable administrative effort and expense have to be devoted to preventing ''crowd-out.'' The system has to be designed carefully to minimize incentives for employers to drop coverage so that they can become eligible for the subsidy, and safeguards have to be in place to ensure that only eligible employers and employees get subsidies. Making all low-wage employers eligible eliminates these significant administrative burdens and expenses.
Second, although allowing employers that already offer coverage to receive the tax credit adds to the budgetary cost, the total real resource cost to society-in terms of additional medical services utilizedwould be essentially the same whether or not currently offering firms were eligible for the subsidy: only newly insured employees would consume additional medical resources. It can be presumed that previously covered employees already consume a full range of medical services. The real cost to society is the foregone opportunity to apply these resources to other uses, but that would be the same in either case. The difference between the two eligibility options is not the cost, but whether the cost appears in public or private budgets-and that has important political implications. To the extent that an employer already offering coverage used the new credits to enhance benefits or maintain or lower employee premium shares, this feature could help to reduce the extent of ''underinsurance'' among low-wage employees or to moderate financial burdens.
A Tax Credit Large Enough to Induce an Acceptable Take-Up Rate
The tax credit needs to be large enough to cause a significant proportion of employers that do not offer insurance to begin offering health coverage. For reasons about to be explained, we think that the credit should be about half the cost of reasonably comprehensive coverage.
As noted earlier, past experience with small tax credits has been dismal. Employers largely have disregarded the incentives. The cost of health coverage is particularly high for smaller firms, and they are often the least able to pay the high cost because many are on the margin of financial solvency. While some may be induced to participate by a small tax credit, most will require that the government pick up a major share.
The subsidy not only has to be large enough to induce employers to participate; it also has to be large enough that the employer's premium contribution is sufficient to induce employees to participate. For this reason, it is worth examining the evidence on how large a tax credit it would take to induce employees to participate in employer-sponsored coverage. A recent study by Mark Pauly and Bradley Herring concludes that for low-income workers and their dependents below 300% of the poverty line, where the uninsured are disproportionately found, ''substantial reductions in the number of uninsured will require credits in the range of a third to a half of the individual insurance premiums, with credits needed to be even greater than 50% for families with incomes at the bottom of this range' ' (1999, p. 27) . Presumably, employer contributions of approximately the same magnitude also would induce employees to accept the employer-subsidized coverage.
In light of the discouraging experience with small credits, it seems likely that a credit that equals or approaches about half the cost of a rather comprehensive health plan would be needed. Setting the credit too low as a proportion of the premium, or pegging this proportion to a very basic plan that firms and employees would not want to select, could lead to a low take-up rate and therefore a minimal effect on the number of uninsured.
Under the proposed design, an employer eligible for the full subsidy could contribute 50% of the premium and have that amount completely reimbursed through the tax credit. The employer's net costs of providing coverage would be zero. Employees would be required to contribute the remaining 50%. A 50% contribution could be burdensome, however, for lowwage workers. It is hoped that with such a generous subsidy, many employers would contribute an amount above the value of the subsidy, thereby easing the burden on employees. If this did not occur, however, an alternative would be to require the employer to contribute an additional portion (for example, 25% more than the employer credit) in order to receive the tax credit. In effect, employers and employees would split the remaining premium cost. This requirement on employers would force some firms to contribute more of the premium cost than they would otherwise. Although the extra amount would be a deductible business expense, the requirement would lower employers' take-up rate, at least to some degree. At the same time, it would increase the take-up rate for workers in firms that do take the credit. Without this requirement, more firms would take the credit, but a smaller proportion of workers would enroll in health plans.
Credits to employers also could be accompanied with direct premium assistance for low-wage employees to cover the employee share of the premium. These could be in the form of tax credits or direct premium assistance programs. 3 Another way to ease the burden on low-wage workers who must contribute toward premiums would be to coordinate financial assistance from other programs, such as Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). This is discussed in detail later.
Fixed-Dollar Credit
A fixed-dollar credit amount provides firms with incentives to purchase reasonably priced, high-value health plans. The lower the premium for the plans selected, the higher the proportion of the cost that would be defrayed by the credit. Because the subsidy would be limited, employers and employees also would have incentives to choose plans that offer a high level of benefits (in terms of quality of care, levels of service, covered services, etc.) relative to premium cost.
An open-ended subsidy, in contrast, would provide an incentive for firms to ''overpurchase'' insurance. The incentive would be similar to that embedded in the current tax exclusion, which permits workers to not count as taxable income the full value of their employers' contribution to health coverage.
The fixed-dollar subsidy, unlike an open-ended one, would help limit the cost to the federal government.
Tying Credit to the Price of a Defined ''Standard'' Benefit Package
The tax credit for employers would be set as a fixed proportion of the nationwide average cost of an efficiently provided ''standard'' benefit package. Coverage should include such vital services as hospital care, emergency department care, physician visits, preventive services, x-rays, laboratory work, prescription drugs, and mental health services. The levels of patient cost-sharing should be reasonable. The price would be determined by looking at the cost when these services are provided by an efficient health plan with appropriate controls over utilization and cost-effective relationships with providers. The purpose of choosing this approach is to keep budgetary costs down and to provide incentives for employers to select efficient health plans to offer their workers.
The specification of a benefit package would be used only to set the level of the subsidy. Employers would not be required to offer coverage that includes the minimum benefits (though they would be required to comply with any state-mandated benefits and to make a minimum contribution, as explained subsequently). An argument could be made for requiring coverage that includes specified minimum benefits to ensure minimum levels of coverage. However, defining a required benefit package is extraordinarily controversial. Moreover, as technologies and patterns of medical practice evolve, the content of a minimum benefit package constantly should be redefined. We think it best to avoid those complications.
Uniform Credit Nationwide
The amount of the tax credit would be uniform across the nation. A case could be made for varying the credit by geographic area because health care premiums vary sharply from region to region. With a uniform credit level pegged to a national average, the purchasing power of employers in regions with high health care costs would be less than intended, while employers in low-cost regions would be overcompensated. However, this consideration is outweighed by the need to keep the tax-credit plan workable and administratively feasible. The U.S. Treasury Department could be expected to oppose vigorously any provision in this plan that called for regional varia-208 tion in the subsidy level. The Treasury Department would argue rightly that all other tax credits (for example, the earned income tax credit, the child care credit) are uniform across the nation.
In addition, raising the value of the tax credit in areas of the country with relatively high health care costs might send the wrong signal. The federal government would be seen as underwriting inefficient care delivery in high-cost regions, which goes against the grain of building cost discipline into the health care system. Payers with a national perspective are asking why various measures of utilization (for example, hospital admission rates, hospital bed days per 1,000 population, or surgery rates for certain highcost procedures) are much higher in some parts of the country than in others. The federal government probably should not undercut this pressure by propping up higher costs with higher subsidies.
The credit also would not be adjusted for other characteristics of a firm's workforce that could have a predictable effect on its health-coverage outlays, such as the average age of workers, their health status, and their past medical-claims experience. Although a case could be made for such adjustments to assist employers who have an older or less healthy workforce, the need to keep the plan administratively simple argues against adopting such a provision.
Updating the Credit Amount
To ensure that the purchasing power of the credit does not dwindle over time because of inflation, the defined benefit package would be repriced from year to year. Any necessary changes in the composition of the package would be made at the same time. Again, the price would be what an efficient, highquality health plan would charge for the defined set of services. This approach would ensure that the subsidy stays equal to some fixed proportion of an appropriate benefit package as medical care costs increase and as technology and changing social values redefine what should be included in a reasonably comprehensive benefit package. Repricing on this basis does involve a degree of complexity that some alternatives would avoid.
The principal alternative is to update the credit annually in line with general inflation in the economy. If past experience is any guide, this would mean that the real purchasing power of the credit would rise at a slower rate compared to our preferred approach. The argument for this alternative approach has to do with cost discipline. Just as varying the credit by region could prop up higher health costs in some areas, adjusting the credit upward in line with health costs could contribute to the ongoing gap between the escalation in health care spending and spending in the rest of the economy. By updating for economywide inflation, the federal government would keep the credits from eroding rapidly but at the same time would apply some pressure to bring health care spending increases under control. However, on balance, we do not find this argument persuasive. The kinds of employers expected to take advantage of the tax credit are generally small and marginally profitable, and would have little power to influence the rate of cost escalation for health care services. Moreover, if health care cost escalation were to outpace general inflation substantially, after a few years the purchasing power of the credit would be so eroded that the subsidy would be insufficient to induce many employers and employees to take coverage.
Minimum Contribution Level
Firms would have to contribute at least 50% of the cost of the ''standard'' benefit package. For firms receiving the full tax credit, this requirement means that they would not be required to make any net (after-subsidy) contribution. However, firms with wage levels too high to qualify for the full credit would have to make a net contribution. This feature is consistent with the notion that subsidies are tied to ability to pay.
The main purpose of this requirement is to ensure that employees of all participating firms, including those not receiving the full tax credit, benefit from a substantial employer contribution, thereby making coverage more affordable for employees and increasing the employee take-up rate. It is also worth noting that some health plans that sell coverage to small employers require that employers contribute at least 50% of the premium. Insurers impose this requirement because they want to encourage broader participation in the group and thus reduce the likelihood that the only people who buy coverage are those who know they are likely to need expensive medical services.
The disadvantage of requiring a 50% minimum premium contribution is that it will deter some employers who are not eligible for the full 50% subsidy from accepting the tax credit and offering coverage. In the absence of the requirement, some of these employers might be willing to offer coverage if there were no net cost to them, at least initially. Additionally, some of those might-after having experience providing coverage-be willing to use their own re-209 sources to continue coverage. Such employers would be lost from the system.
Note that we do not propose that employers be required to buy coverage that includes any minimum benefit package. We do require, however, a substantial premium contribution, enough to pay half of the cost of such a benefit package. After that, we let the market operate, based on the assumption that employers and their employees are in the best position to determine what kind of coverage best meets employees' needs. For example, they might decide to use the 50% amount to cover 80% of a somewhat less comprehensive set of benefits.
We do not propose that employers be required to make a contribution toward dependent coverage (though they would be required to offer dependent coverage). Although requiring a contribution to dependent coverage certainly would help to reduce the number of uninsured people, we decided against such a mandate because it almost surely would reduce the take-up rate among employers. Moreover, working spouses employed by low-wage firms also could become eligible for coverage when their employer accepted the tax credit, and the family's children might be eligible for some other subsidized program, such as SCHIP.
Minimum Requirements Regarding Who is Covered
Employers would be required to offer coverage on the same terms to all full-time employees, defined as those working 32 hours or more per week. Employers could impose a waiting period before extending coverage to newly hired workers, but the maximum waiting period would be six months.
In firms with a preponderance of low-wage workers and a few high-wage workers, it is possible that the high-wage workers would accept the employers' offer but that most low-wage workers would not. While such a result would be inefficient in terms of targeting the subsidy to a population in need, it is a price worth paying and, in any case, probably would not be a frequent occurrence.
Employers could cover, but would not be required to cover, part-time, temporary, and seasonal employees. Firms would receive the full tax credit for covering such workers as an incentive to include this growing segment of the workforce. A requirement could be imposed to make the tax credit conditional on equitable participation of workers across different wage levels. Of course, the credit would apply only to premiums actually paid during the year. The credit thus would be based on the yearly average of the per-member, per-month premium payment. In calculating average wage levels, the wages of temporary and part-time workers would be included on a pro rata basis.
Firms could not include in the wage calculation amounts paid to leased or contract workers even if they worked at the company's work site. Self-employed consultants and contract workers could receive the tax credits as separate business entities, however, if they meet the wage criteria and if their state recognizes businesses with one employee as eligible for ''group'' coverage (discussed further subsequently).
A minimum participation requirement might be set. For example, at least 50% of eligible workers might need to enroll in the health plan for a firm to receive the tax credit. An advantage of such a requirement is that the employer might work harder to encourage workers to participate, possibly contributing more toward the premium. Also, greater participation would help spread risk over a larger group and reduce adverse selection. Health coverage for groups frequently contains minimum participation rules for this reason. However, if some workers refuse to participate, they could deprive others of the chance to have health coverage. Therefore, the tax credit we propose does not contain an explicit minimum participation requirement, but rather leaves such guidelines to existing insurance rules.
Different Credit for Workers Purchasing Single and Family Coverage
The tax credit amount would vary for single and family coverage, rather than be a single amount based on a blend of single and family premiums. This removes the incentive for firms to favor hiring single workers or those whose spouses and children are covered under plans of the spouse's employer. With a blended rate, firms hiring single workers or those with spousal coverage would receive a windfall gain.
In practice, health plans often have at least three or four rates-for example, single coverage, worker and spouse, parent and children (no spouse), and full family coverage (two adults and children). But having so many variations may be too complicated. The two-rate structure seems a fair compromise, and the family policy rate could be tied to a benefit package cost that is a blend of different types of family coverage.
Firms could take the credit only for workers who enroll in the company plan. The total credit could not be greater than the amount a firm contributes toward premiums. Thus, if a worker were enrolled in a spouse's plan, the spouse's employer would get the credit but not the worker's employer. This would avoid double crediting.
Proof of Purchase
Firms would be required to demonstrate to the IRS that they purchase insurance or self-fund coverage that meets the requirements of the program. They also would need to document the amount they pay for coverage, and prove that they are making regular, periodic payments equal to or exceeding half the premium cost of the standard benefit package. Employers would have to document the annual average of the per-member, per-month premium payment for both single and family coverage.
While a firm was receiving the tax credit, it could not deduct the amount of the subsidy as a business expense. That is, it could claim as a business expense deduction only the net (after-tax credit) contribution to health coverage.
Overcoming Business Cash-Flow Problems and Changing Numbers of Workers
Some employers could have difficulty paying for coverage throughout the year and waiting to be reimbursed until well into the following year when they calculate their taxes. A system of advance credits or payments by the government might address this cashflow problem. For example, employers filing quarterly tax returns could be permitted to reduce their tax liability each quarter to reflect the expected value of the tax credit. The credit also could be made refundable so that companies that have little or no tax liability would receive a net payment.
Advance payments would alleviate cash-flow problems for many small firms. However, this approach might create some administrative complexity involving the year-end reconciliation between advance payments and the actual amount for which a firm becomes eligible. For example, a firm might claim advance payments using calculations based on 20 workers. If the firm downsized and ended the year with fewer workers, its premium payouts might be less than predicted. If the discrepancy were small, the problem might be handled by offsetting the amount against allowable tax credits for the next year.
Making Employers Aware of the Credit
An important challenge involves developing a publicity campaign to acquaint employers with the tax credit. An outreach effort is a vital feature of a tax-credit program; past efforts at the state and local levels have been seriously limited because firms were unaware that subsidies were available. A multimedia initiative could include: a website with information on how to apply for the credit; newspaper, radio, and television public-service advertisements; and announcements through Chambers of Commerce and other business groups. The federal government would need to appropriate sufficient funds to ensure an effective outreach effort.
Interacting with Other Programs
The tax credit for employers would have to be coordinated with other programs to promote an integrated, comprehensive approach to broadening health coverage for uninsured workers and their families. As discussed earlier, even when employers offer coverage and pay 50% of the cost, workers in firms newly offering health insurance still may face significant financial barriers that discourage them from accepting such offers. A survey of low-wage employers that offered coverage found that among firms with five to 49 employees, 36% paid 50% or less of the premium. Among firms with 50 to 99 employees, 41% paid 50% or less. 4 It is likely that many firms taking the tax credit would pay the minimum 50% of the premium or just slightly more. Their workers might find that they could not afford to pick up the difference and thus would decline coverage. Thus, it is important to couple efforts to get a good take-up rate among employers with a corresponding effort to obtain a good take-up rate among employees.
As noted earlier, this line of reasoning supports federal subsidies for low-wage workers as well as their employers. States also could develop strategies for assisting low-wage workers who would have to contribute a substantial amount to employer-sponsored health coverage. For example, states could use both Medicaid and SCHIP funds to assist workers with their contributions to premiums. Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Wisconsin have initiatives underway to do this. Florida and Oregon have proposals under review at the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).
Since the tax credits are targeted to lower-wage firms, a substantial proportion of eligible workers will have children eligible for SCHIP. A coordinated strategy for insuring the whole family could involve helping the parent afford the contribution to employer coverage while enrolling the children in SCHIP. Alternatively, states have the flexibility to enroll the whole family in SCHIP if they can demonstrate that it is cost-effective to do so.
States also could reinforce the proposed federal program of employer tax credits by offering tax credits or subsidies to low-wage workers to help them pay their share of the premium. Massachusetts recently began a statewide program that includes premium assistance both for small businesses with lowwage workers and for low-wage (low-income) workers (Silow-Carroll, Waldman, and Meyer 2000) . (As noted earlier, a few states have tried this approach on a very limited basis, using very small credits.) States might want to consider using a tax-credit approach more in line with the one outlined in this report. While such credits would cost more than those tried earlier, states might be able to recapture some of the cost in the form of lower outlays under Medicaid and SCHIP.
Regulatory Requirements
If a tax-credit approach is implemented, most of the firms newly offering coverage will be small. Thus, it is important to consider how the market for smallgroup coverage operates. In the past, the smallgroup market did not work well. Insurers used costly resources to attract low-risk groups and avoided insuring high-risk groups. Higher-risk groups were denied coverage or were charged prohibitively high rates. Individuals who changed jobs might be denied coverage by the insurer covering their new employer, or coverage for an existing illness might be excluded. Even low-risk groups paid more for coverage than large groups. Changes in both federal and state law corrected many of the worst abuses, so that now no small employer can be denied coverage. In addition, exclusions for pre-existing conditions are limited to reasonable periods of time; employees who move to a new job are guaranteed coverage under the new employer's health plan, and premium variations between high-risk and low-risk groups are restricted.
Nevertheless, problems remain with the smallgroup market. The relevant federal law, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HI-PAA), is silent in terms of limiting the amount by which health plans can vary premium rates between high-risk and low-risk groups. States have been left with responsibility for setting those limits. Although most states have imposed some limits, the permitted rate variation differs greatly from state to state. In some instances, the allowable rate variation between high-risk and low-risk groups can exceed a ratio of 10:1. This means that in some states, providing a substantial tax credit would not make coverage affordable for a small high-risk employer. Legislation limiting to reasonable levels premium variation based on health status or past medical claims experience might remedy this problem. The federal government has so far been reluctant to regulate in this area.
Another problem with the small-group market seems to present no easy solution. A relatively high proportion of the premium goes to pay for administrative costs rather than medical expenses. Proponents of health purchasing alliances, coalitions, or cooperatives (HPCs) had hoped that collective purchasing would produce savings in administrative costs and give small groups bargaining power to negotiate better rates generally. The expectation was that by centralizing some of the tasks such as marketing, premium collection and payment, and resolving claims disputes-tasks which normally would be done by individual companies and individual insurance agents-HPCs could achieve economies of scale.
Although HPCs have experienced some successes in other respects, they have not been able to reduce the cost of coverage appreciably for small employers (Wicks, Hall, and Meyer 2000) . The evidence indicates that it will be difficult for them to reduce administrative costs unless they attain a substantially larger market share than they have yet been able to do. For this reason, a case could be made for requiring small employers who accept the tax credit to buy coverage through HPC-like entities. Such a requirement could help HPCs attain the critical-mass size that would let them achieve administrative savings. The lower premium that would result would induce more employers to accept the credit, which means that the federal subsidy would be more successful in getting uninsured people covered.
Alternatives to requiring participation in a HPC are: 1) making sure that a purchasing alliance is available, or 2) permitting small employers to obtain coverage through state employee health programs. Under either scenario, small employers would have the opportunity to benefit from key advantages of being part of a larger group entity. HPCs and most state employee programs allow individuals in a group to select different health plans. This increases the probability that employees and their families will be able to get coverage that permits them to keep their current doctors and to choose a plan that best meets their needs and preferences. Moreover, the economies of scale that HPCs achieve allow them to present comparative information about plan features and performance in a way that firms accepting the tax credit could not do on their own. Both employers and employees would be likely to make better choices as a result.
The self-employed present special problems. Some self-employed people are low-wage ''employers,'' although they have only one employee (the owner). The small-group reform laws in a number of states define the self-employed as a ''group of one.'' HI-PAA, however, includes only groups of two or more. For purposes of extending coverage to more uninsured people, a case could be made for making groups of one eligible for the tax credit. However, this option poses many complications. Insurers argue that groups of one are much like individually insured people, and that offering them coverage poses real dangers of adverse selection. Self-employed people who know that they need coverage will buy it, while healthier self-employed people will not. Insurers argue that some people start firms merely for the purpose of qualifying for (less expensive) group coverage. We propose to deal with this issue by making self-employed people eligible for the tax credit if their state's small-group reform laws apply to groups of one; otherwise, they would be excluded. This seems to be a reasonable compromise, and it might mitigate some of the opposition that insurers likely would mount against the inclusion of the self-employed where state law does not define them as a group.
Strengths and Weaknesses
This employer tax-credit approach to subsidizing the expansion of health insurance coverage has significant strengths compared to other approaches. First, it is administratively simple. It requires no new bureaucracy or significant new administrative apparatus; tax credits for business have been used many times previously. Monitoring and enforcement should be relatively easy. Employers who want to take advantage of the tax credit could do so without having to take on onerous burdens to prove eligibility or to conform with the rules.
Second, the tax-credit approach is politically more palatable than some other ideas. It does not require a federal budgetary authorization; the financing comes in the form of foregone revenues. Of course, the ultimate impact of foregone revenues is the same as if a comparable budget amount were spent, but the political onus is smaller. In addition, the phaseout for higher-wage employers greatly reduces the cost in terms of foregone tax revenues. Finally, as outlined here, the tax credit for employers relies heavily on the market, in the sense that it delegates to employers the decision about how much and what kind of benefits to offer, and gives them complete latitude in choosing health plans.
Third, this tax-credit plan is targeted efficiently. Since only low-wage firms (and their employees) would be eligible, very little of the money would go to people who were not needy. Nearly all who would end up with coverage-even those who already were covered-would be people whose incomes were low enough to justify the subsidy.
Fourth, by subsidizing employers, the approach encourages the expansion of group coverage, unlike a subsidy for individuals, which likely would expand individual insurance coverage. Group coverage is more efficient than individual coverage, with administrative and marketing costs spread over a larger base. By pooling risk, group coverage stabilizes and evens out costs for people with varied risk profiles.
The most obvious disadvantage of the tax-credit approach is that it is incremental and would help only some of the uninsured. It would be targeted to workers, but not to all of them. Some employers that would qualify for the tax credit might never learn about it. Others might decline the credit, either because they distrust government or because they do not want to pay their share of the premium and make the implied promise to continue to do so. Even if employers were to offer coverage, some employees would decline it, either because the financial burden still would be too great or for other reasons. Some would get coverage for themselves but not for their spouses or children.
Some employees who would buy coverage if the subsidy were provided directly to them rather than through their employers could end up without coverage should their employers decide not to take advantage of the tax credit. In other words, the number of covered employees probably would be higher if the same credit were available directly to workers. On the other hand, workers who received a direct subsidy but whose employers did not provide coverage would be forced into the individual insurance market, where a premium dollar buys less coverage and higher-risk people have difficulty getting affordable coverage. Correcting deficiencies of the individual market is an arduous task.
Finally, compared to a more comprehensive approach to achieving near-universal coverage, employer tax credits would add yet another incremental
